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Statements to the Congress 
Statement by Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, before the 
Subcommittee on Finance and Hazardous Materials 
of the Committee on Commerce, U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives, March 3, 1999 
Preparing for the retirement of the baby boom genera-
tion looms as one of our nation's most difficult chal-
lenges, and I commend the serious efforts being made 
here to address this important long-term problem. 
Before discussing my views on the issue of investing 
the social security trust fund in equities, I would like 
to examine the more fundamental issues that any 
retirement reform will have to address. 
The dramatic increase in the ratio of retirees to 
workers that seems inevitable, as the baby boom 
generation moves to retirement and enjoys ever-
greater longevity, makes our current pay-as-you-go 
social security system unsustainable. Furthermore, 
the broad support for social security appears destined 
to fade as the implications of its current form of 
financing become increasingly apparent. To date, 
with the ratio of retirees to workers having been 
relatively low, workers have not considered it a bur-
den to share the goods and services they produce with 
retirees. The rising birth rate after World War II, 
which, in due course, contained the growth of the 
ratio of retirees to workers, helped make the social 
security program exceptionally popular, even among 
those paying the taxes to support it. 
Indeed, workers perceived it to be a good invest-
ment for their own retirement. For those born before 
World War II, the annuity value of benefits on retire-
ment far exceeded the cumulative sum at the time of 
retirement of contributions by the worker and his or 
her employer, plus interest. For example, the implicit 
real rate of return on social security contributions 
was almost 10 percent for those born in 1905 and was 
about 6 percent for those born in 1920. The real 
interest rate on U.S. Treasury securities, by compari-
son, has generally been less than 3 percent. 
But births flattened after the baby boom, and life 
expectancy beyond age sixty-five continued to rise. 
Consequently, the ratio of the number of workers 
contributing to social security to the number of bene-
ficiaries has declined to the point that maintaining 
the annuity value of benefits on retirement at a level 
well in excess of accumulated contributions has 
become increasingly unlikely. Those born in 1960, 
for example, are currently calculated to receive a real 
rate of return, on average, of less than 2 percent on 
their cumulative contributions. Indeed, even these 
low rates of return for more recent cohorts likely are 
being overestimated because they are based on cur-
rent law taxes and benefits. In all likelihood, short 
of a substantial infusion of general revenues, social 
security taxes will have to be raised, or benefits cut, 
given that the system as a whole is still significantly 
underfunded, at least according to the intermediate 
projections of the Old-Age and Survivors Insur-
ance (OASI) actuaries. For the present value of cur-
rent law benefits over the next seventy-five years to 
be fully funded through contributions, social security 
taxes would have to be raised about 2.2 percent of 
taxable payroll; to be fully funded in perpetuity, that 
is, to ensure that taxes and interest income will 
always be sufficient to pay benefits, social security 
taxes would have to be raised much more—perhaps 
about 4 percent to 5 percent of taxable payroll. 
This issue of funding underscores the critical ele-
ments in the forthcoming debate on social security 
reform because it focuses on the core of any retire-
ment system, private or public. Simply put, enough 
resources must be set aside over a lifetime of work to 
fund retirement consumption. At the most rudimen-
tary level, one could envision households saving by 
actually storing goods purchased during their work-
ing years for consumption during retirement. Even 
better, the resources that would have otherwise gone 
into the stored goods could be diverted to the produc-
tion of new capital assets, which would, cumula-
tively, over a working lifetime, produce an even 
greater quantity of goods and services to be con-
sumed in retirement. 
The only way we will be able to finance retirement 
incomes that keep pace with workers' incomes is to 
substantially increase the national saving rate, 
increase the borrowing of foreign capital, or increase 
the output that a given capital stock, financed through 
this saving, can produce. The crucial retirement fund-
ing issues center on how to increase our national 
saving and how to allocate physical resources 
between workers and retirees in the future. We must 
endeavor to increase the real resources available to 
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retirees without blunting the growth in living stan-
dards among our working population. 
In this light, increasing our national saving is 
essential to any social security reform. Privatization 
proposals that begin to address social security's exist-
ing unfunded liability would significantly enhance 
domestic savings; so would fuller funding of the 
current social security program. But the size of the 
unified budget surplus implied by such funding, many 
have argued, would be politically unsustainable. The 
President, recognizing this political risk, has pro-
posed changing the budgetary framework so as to 
support a large unified budget surplus. This is a major 
step in the right direction that, if effective, would 
ensure that the current rise in government's positive 
contribution to national saving is sustained. The large 
surpluses projected over the next fifteen years, if they 
actually materialize, would significantly reduce the 
fiscal pressures created by our changing demograph-
ics. Whichever direction the Congress chooses to go, 
whether toward privatization or fuller funding of 
social security, augmenting our national saving rate 
has to be the main objective. 
The Administration has also proposed investing a 
portion of the social security trust fund assets in 
equities, rather than in U.S. Treasuries alone. Having 
the trust fund invest in private securities most likely 
would increase its rate of return, although the 
increase might be less than historical rates of return 
would suggest and certainly would be less on a 
properly risk-adjusted basis. But where would that 
higher return come from, and what would happen 
to private funds available for consumption in 
retirement? 
If social security trust funds are shifted from U.S. 
Treasury securities to private debt and equity instru-
ments, holders of those securities in the private sector 
must be induced to exchange them, on net, for U.S. 
Treasuries. Private pension and insurance funds, 
among other holders of equities, presumably would 
swap equities for Treasuries. It seems likely that a 
rise in the interest rate paid on Treasuries, and per-
haps an increase in equity prices and a reduction in 
the expected future return on equity, would be neces-
sary in order to induce private investors to reallocate 
their portfolios from equities to U.S. Treasury securi-
ties. If this is indeed the case, then the net increment 
to the government of investing the trust fund in 
equities on an ongoing basis presumably would be 
less than the historical rates of return suggest. That 
said, exactly what changes in bond and stock prices 
would result from this type of large-scale swap of 
U.S. Treasuries for equities is extremely difficult to 
predict. 
But analyzing the macroeconomic effects of the 
portfolio reallocation is much less complicated. The 
transfer of social security assets from U.S. Treasuries 
to equities would not, in itself, have any effect on 
national saving. Thus, the underlying economic assets 
in the economy would be unchanged, as would the 
total income generated by those assets. Any increase 
in returns realized by social security must be offset 
by a reduction in returns earned on private portfolios, 
which represent, to a large extent, funds held for 
retirement. Investing social security assets in equities 
is, then, largely a zero-sum game. To a first approxi-
mation, aggregate retirement resources—from both 
social security and private funds—do not change. 
Only an increase in national saving or an increase 
in the efficiency with which we use our saving can 
help us meet the retirement requirements of the com-
ing years. Indeed, improved productivity of capital 
probably explains much of why the American econ-
omy has done so well in recent years despite our 
comparatively low national saving rate. For produc-
tivity and standards of living to grow, financial capi-
tal raised in markets or generated from internal cash 
flow from existing plant and equipment must be 
continuously directed by firms to its most profitable 
uses—namely new physical capital facilities per-
ceived as the most efficient in serving consumers' 
multiple preferences. It is this continuous churning, 
this so-called creative destruction, that has become so 
essential to the effective deployment of advanced 
technologies by this country over recent decades. 
Looking forward, the effective application of our 
capital to its most highly valued use is going to 
become, if anything, more important, as we strive to 
increase the resources available to provide for the 
retirement of the baby boomers without, in the future, 
significantly reducing the consumption of workers. 
An efficient market pricing mechanism for equities 
has been a key element in our superior allocation of 
saving into investment this past decade. Large invest-
ments in equities by the social security trust funds 
could impair that process. 
As I have indicated in earlier testimony, I doubt 
that it is possible to secure and sustain institutional 
arrangements that would insulate, over the long run, 
the trust funds from political pressures. These 
pressures, whether direct or indirect, could result in 
suboptimal performance by our capital markets, 
diminished economic efficiency, and lower overall 
standards of living than would be achieved otherwise. 
The experience of public pension funds seems to 
bear this out. Although relevant comparisons to pri-
vate plans are difficult to construct, there is evidence 
that the average rate of return on state and local 
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pension funds tends to be lower than the return 
realized on comparable private pension funds, other 
pooled investments, and market indexes. Of course, a 
significant part of this disparity would be eliminated 
were these returns adjusted for risk because public 
pension plans are often invested more conservatively 
than private plans. But there is evidence that returns 
are lower even after having accounted for differences 
in the portfolio allocation between stocks and bonds. 
For example, it has been shown that state pension 
plans that are required to direct a portion of their 
investments in-state and those that make "economi-
cally targeted investments" experience lower returns 
as a result. Similarly, there is evidence suggesting 
that the greater the proportion of trustees who are 
political appointees, the lower the rate of return. A 
lower risk-adjusted rate of return on financial assets 
is almost invariably an indication of lower rates of 
return on the real underlying assets on which they are 
a claim. 
As I have also indicated in previous testimony, I do 
not deny that the federal government can manage 
equities without political interference if they are held 
in defined contribution funds or small defined benefit 
plans, such as the one run by the Federal Reserve. 
Defined contribution funds, such as the federal gov-
ernment's Thrift Savings Plan, are effectively self-
policed by individual contributors, who would surely 
object were their retirement assets to be diverted to 
investments that offered less than market returns. 
But government defined benefit plans, like social 
security, provide guaranteed annuities that are wholly 
insulated from poor investment performance. Annu-
itants look to the federal government for their retire-
ment incomes, not the performance of any trust funds. 
Thus, beneficiaries have no incentive to monitor the 
performance of their investments. And while the gov-
ernment's small defined benefit funds do not reach 
the asset size threshold to make them a target, a 
multitrillion dollar social security trust fund presum-
ably would. 
It is possible that institutions could be created that 
would prevent the trust fund investments from being 
subject to political interference. But investing the 
social security trust funds in equities does little or 
nothing to improve the overall ability of the U.S. 
economy to meet the retirement needs of the next 
century. Given this lack of evident benefit, it is 
unclear to me why we should take on the risk of 
interference, which, probably short of a constitutional 
amendment, cannot be eliminated. Even if concerns 
about politically driven investment were not to mate-
rialize, what would have been gained by such a huge 
shuffling of funds? 
To the extent that a transfer of private retirement 
resources to social security is deemed necessary to 
fund currently promised benefits, why not do it 
directly through increased social security taxes or an 
allocation of general revenues to the social security 
trust fund? Whatever the Congress does, it would be 
best not to obscure the choice of real resource alloca-
tion with complex financial structures that merely 
reshuffle claims to real resources, without increasing 
them. 
A collateral issue is relevant to this debate. If the 
Congress were to decide to do nothing to alter the 
path of receipts and outlays projected under current 
law, a large buildup in the social security trust fund 
would occur, along with a significant on-budget sur-
plus, according to the projections of the Congres-
sional Budget Office (CBO) and the Office of Man-
agement and Budget (OMB). The consequence 
would, of course, be a significant decline in the 
current $3
3/4 trillion outstanding federal debt to the 
public. 
But if the unified budget is in surplus for a pro-
tracted period of years, it is at least conceivable that 
the outstanding public debt would be eliminated. I 
might add that this would be the first such occurrence 
for this nation, the previous low having been 
$38,000 in 1835 and 1836. 
Currently, the rise in the holdings of U.S. Treasur-
ies by the social security trust fund is accomplished 
by the Treasury redeeming or buying back debt from 
the public and selling it as special series nonmar-
ketables to the trust fund. But should the debt to the 
public fall to zero, there would be no additional 
Treasury instruments available to the trust fund from 
that source. Were the Treasury, nonetheless, to con-
tinue to sell debt to the trust funds, its cash balances 
at the Federal Reserve would build up. At that point, 
under existing policy, there would be no choice but to 
have the social security trust fund invest in private or 
quasi-private agency securities. I grant that, should 
these circumstances arise, the decision of how to 
handle social security investments would become a 
more pressing question. However, it is exceptionally 
difficult for me to focus seriously on so politically 
improbable, though so intriguing, an event. 
Of course, assessing the fiscal, financial, and eco-
nomic state of the American economy in the early 
twenty-first century is an enormously difficult under-
taking. We cannot confidently project large surpluses 
in our unified budget over the next fifteen years, 
given the inherent uncertainties of budget forecast-
ing. How can we ignore the fact that virtually all 
forecasts of the budget balance have been wide of the 
mark in recent years? For example, as recently as 
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February 1997, the OMB projected a deficit for fiscal 
year 1998 of $121 billion—a $191 billion error. The 
CBO and others made similar errors. Likewise, in 
1983, we confidently projected a solvent social secu-
rity trust fund through 2057. Our latest estimate, with 
only a few changes in the program, is 2032. 
It is possible, as some maintain, that the OASI 
actuaries are too conservative and that productivity 
growth could be far greater than is anticipated in their 
"intermediate" estimate. If that is, in fact, our pros-
pect, the social security system is in less jeopardy 
Statement by William J. McDonough, President, Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of New York, before the Subcom-
mittee on Capital Markets, Securities and Govern-
ment Sponsored Enterprises of the Committee on 
Banking and Financial Services, U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives, March 3, 1999 
When I appeared before the full committee in 
October, I spoke about the near-collapse of Long-
Term Capital Management (LTCM) and the events 
leading up to the private-sector recapitalization of its 
fund, Long-Term Capital Portfolio. At that time, I 
promised you that we would take a hard look at the 
issues growing out of that experience, particularly as 
they affect our responsibilities as bank supervisors. I 
am pleased to appear before you today to report on 
the lessons we have learned and the actions we have 
taken to reduce the possibility that such an episode 
could repeat itself in the future. 
As I indicated last fall, three issues require particu-
lar attention by banks and their supervisors in the 
wake of LTCM. These are, first, the adequacy of 
banks' credit analysis processes; second, the effec-
tiveness of exposure measurement; and third, the role 
of stress testing of counterparty exposure. In my 
remarks today I will detail the substantial progress 
that has been made, both domestically and inter-
nationally, to address each of these supervisory 
concerns. 
But before I get into the details, let me say that I 
believe the LTCM episode and the supervisory 
response to it is fundamentally about two things: 
leverage and good judgment. Leverage is a fact of 
life in our financial world and is a key part of the 
risk-taking necessary for the creation of wealth. But 
sometimes banks go too far in extending credit to 
their customers and counterparties. That's where 
good judgment comes in. I know—I've been there. I 
was a commercial banker for twenty-two years before 
becoming President of the New York Fed, and I can 
tell you that the most important decisions a banker 
than it currently appears. But proper fiscal planning 
requires that consequences of mistakes in all direc-
tions be evaluated. If we move now to shore up the 
social security program, or replace it, in part or in 
whole, with a private system and subsequently find 
that we had been too pessimistic in our projections, 
the costs to our society would be few. If we assume 
more optimistic scenarios and they prove wrong, the 
imbalances could become overwhelming, and finding 
a solution would be even more divisive than today's 
problem. 
makes are how to lend and to whom. Those decisions 
are not easy and often involve many shades of gray. 
One of our aims as supervisors should be to see that 
banks are using the right tools to make those judg-
ments. 
The importance of these issues extends beyond 
banks and their supervisors. Sound credit policies 
and procedures are essential not only for the stability 
of individual banks but also—and more important— 
for the health of the financial system and the econ-
omy as a whole. This is because banks play a pivotal 
role in our economy as providers of credit. If banks 
make poor credit decisions with respect to a bor-
rower, including a hedge fund like LTCM, the finan-
cial system and our economy will suffer. 
BASLE REPORT FINDINGS 
As you know, I chair the Basle Committee on 
Banking Supervision, comprised of bank supervisors 
from the G-10 countries who coordinate supervisory 
policy for internationally active banks. While the 
committee does not have formal legal enforcement 
powers, its conclusions and recommendations are 
widely implemented, both in G-10 countries and 
many others. In late January, the committee issued a 
report dealing with the relationship between banks 
and highly leveraged institutions, or HLIs. The com-
mittee's report provides a framework for addressing 
the broader issues raised by the LTCM episode, the 
policy responses of supervisors, and some key risk-
management challenges for the banking industry 
going forward. 
In the United States, the Federal Reserve System, 
the New York State Banking Department, and the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency have con-
ducted target reviews of a number of large-bank 
dealings with hedge funds. These reviews contributed 
to the committee's work, to the Federal Reserve 
System's issuance on February 1 of new guidance to 
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financial examiners and banks, and to similar guid-
ance from the Comptroller of the Currency issued in 
January. These new standards emphasize the need for 
improvements in the credit-risk-management process 
at banks. The new standards will likely be comple-
mented by a study of the implications of the LTCM 
episode by the President's Working Group on Finan-
cial Markets. 
Because the Basle Committee's jurisdiction is lim-
ited to matters of banking supervision and regulation, 
its primary emphasis has been on ensuring that the 
major banks prudently manage their risk exposures to 
HLIs. The best way to achieve this is through the 
adoption of sound practices by the industry, perhaps 
supplemented by incentives created through capital 
requirements. While it is primarily the responsibility 
of each banking organization to manage its risks, 
sound practice standards give banks and supervisors 
a tool to measure industry progress. If banks them-
selves do not follow sound practices, then supervi-
sors must step in and take the necessary action. 
The committee's report revealed a number of defi-
ciencies. In particular, the committee observed an 
imbalance among the key elements of the credit-risk-
management process, with too strong a reliance upon 
collateral. This undue emphasis, in turn, caused many 
banks to neglect other critical elements of effective 
credit risk management, including in-depth credit 
analyses of counterparties, effective exposure mea-
surement and management techniques, and the use of 
stress testing. 
Credit Approval Process 
For a bank to make sound lending decisions, it needs 
to obtain sufficient information about the borrower. 
Supervisors routinely stress the need for banks to 
have an effective credit approval process consisting 
of formal policies and procedures, accompanied by 
documentation of actual credit decisions. When deal-
ing with an HLI, a bank also must obtain comprehen-
sive and timely financial information about that HLI's 
risk profile and credit quality, and it must engage in 
an ongoing credit analysis of that HLI. In addition, 
a bank must have a clear understanding of an HLI's 
operations and risk-management capabilities. The 
committee observed weaknesses in each of these 
areas. Let me give a few examples. 
The committee found that banks did not obtain 
sufficient financial information to allow for a full 
assessment of how much and what types of risk had 
been assumed by large HLIs. In particular, banks did 
not obtain the information needed to measure lever-
age. They also did not have sufficient information to 
understand HLIs' concentrations in particular mar-
kets and risk categories or their exposure to broad 
trading strategies. 
Similarly, banks generally did not sufficiently 
understand the ability of HLIs to manage their risks. 
Because risk profiles can change from one day to the 
next, or even from moment to moment, it is necessary 
for a bank to be sure that the HLI can effectively 
manage its business operations and risks on an ongo-
ing basis. In general, we did not find sufficient 
reviews of HLIs' risk-management systems and their 
underlying assumptions, back-office systems used to 
manage daily operations such as collateral and liquid-
ity, and the major accounting and valuation policies. 
Exposure Measurement 
The committee also thought that banks need to 
develop better measures for determining the credit 
exposure resulting from different types of trading 
activities. In particular, banks must develop more 
effective measures of what is called "potential future 
exposure." Potential future exposure measures the 
credit exposure between a counterparty and a bank 
and how this exposure could change in the future as 
market prices fluctuate. As we have seen, such price 
movements can be substantial during periods of mar-
ket stress. The ability of banks to measure potential 
future exposure is crucial when dealing with HLIs. 
Unfortunately, methods for calculating potential 
future exposure had not kept pace with the growth 
and complexity of HLIs. Banks' potential future 
exposure measures have been particularly ineffective 
in measuring exposures not covered by collateral. For 
example, under highly volatile market conditions, a 
bank's potential future exposure can grow beyond 
the value of any collateral. We expect the industry to 
develop more effective ways to measure and limit 
potential future exposure, and supervisors will closely 
monitor progress to ensure that this occurs. 
Stress Testing 
The committee's report also shows that banks must 
develop measures that better account for credit risk 
under highly volatile market conditions. This can be 
achieved through what we call "stress tests," in 
which a bank conducts "what if" analyses of how 
credit exposures to a single counterparty could grow 
under extreme market conditions. These analyses 
might include a large rise or fall in interest rates, a 
major change in an exchange rate, or a flight to 
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quality by investors. In the case of LTCM, stress 
testing could have given banks at least some warning 
of the types of exposures they could have faced last 
fall. The critical importance of stress testing is noted 
very explicitly in our new supervisory guidance. 
Sound Practice Guidance 
The sound practices document accompanying the 
Basle report presents an important set of standards 
that will guide both banks and their supervisors. It 
appears that banks generally have tightened the 
credit-risk-management standards for their HLI expo-
sures since the collapse of LTCM. However, it is 
important that supervisors try to ensure that progress 
continues. Memories tend to be short, and we want to 
make sure that as markets calm down, as they have in 
the past months, banks do not return to the old ways 
of doing business. 
The adoption and rigorous enforcement of 
enhanced risk-management practices should contrib-
ute substantially to limiting excessive risk-taking 
and leverage at HLIs. This is the case because HLIs 
cannot trade without access to financing and liquidity 
from banks and securities firms. If each counterparty 
manages its risks appropriately, the chance of conta-
gion to other institutions and the financial markets 
more broadly would be reduced substantially. It is 
this risk of contagion and financial market instability 
that is the principal concern of central banks and 
supervisors. 
Along with other federal banking supervisors, the 
Federal Reserve has moved quickly to implement the 
recommendations of the Basle Committee's report. 
As I mentioned earlier, we recently issued guidance 
to the institutions we supervise detailing sound risk-
management practices for the credit-risk-management 
of trading and derivatives activities. This document 
identifies the areas that our examiners will review 
during their examination of trading activities. It is 
important to note that the Federal Reserve's guidance 
to banks and examiners covers not only HLI and 
hedge fund counterparties but all other counterparty 
relationships. We want to ensure that banks carry 
forward the lessons of the LTCM experience to all 
potentially high-risk trading activities. 
In this regard, our examiners will devote particular 
attention to the.risks associated with rapidly growing, 
highly profitable, and potentially high-risk activities 
and product lines. They will assess the adequacy 
of banks' reviews of counterparty creditworthiness, 
exposure measurement and monitoring techniques, 
stress testing, limit setting, and the appropriate use of 
collateral and other credit enhancements. Our exam-
iners will also look at internal policies and the degree 
to which behavior conforms to stated policies. We 
have already conducted meetings with the major 
banks to reinforce these messages, and our examiners 
will conduct follow-up reviews in the course of this 
year. 
OTHER POSSIBLE POLICY RESPONSES 
Over the past few months, there has been significant 
debate about other measures that could be taken to 
limit the potential risks to the financial system arising 
from the activities of large, highly leveraged, unreg-
ulated financial institutions. The Basle Committee 
carefully considered all the ideas that have surfaced. 
Our report discusses a variety of options beyond the 
implementation of sound practice standards. One pos-
sibility is to require higher capital charges for bank 
exposures to HLIs. Indeed, a primary objective of our 
current review of the Basle Capital Accord is to 
determine how to align regulatory capital charges 
better with the economic risks of different classes of 
counterparties. 
We also recognize the critical need to enhance 
market transparency for the activities of HLIs and 
other major market participants. The committee 
already is working to enhance accounting and disclo-
sure practices at banking institutions worldwide. 
Extending these efforts to all global players that have 
the potential to destabilize the financial system, 
including HLIs, is of particular importance. An inter-
national group of central bankers is now studying 
various approaches to strengthening disclosure in this 
area. 
The committee also considered the advantages and 
disadvantages of imposing direct regulation on the 
HLI industry. There are a number of critical obstacles 
that would have to be overcome before a direct 
regulatory approach could be implemented. To be 
effective, any regulation would have to extend to 
jurisdictions around the world where HLIs are char-
tered, some of which have more highly developed 
and more stringent supervisory structures than others. 
This would require a high level of coordination 
involving the political, legislative, and judicial bodies 
of many countries. There is also the difficulty of 
establishing a regulatory regime for HLIs that is not 
easily circumvented. For these reasons, I believe the 
most practical approach is to focus on financial insti-
tutions' lending activities because such an approach 
offers a near-term and cost-effective remedy to the 
systemic risks posed by HLIs. 
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CHALLENGES FOR THE BANKING INDUSTRY 
I strongly believe that both the official and private 
sectors have important roles to play in addressing the 
challenges arising from an increasingly complex and 
dynamic financial services industry. First and fore-
most, we hold banks accountable for ensuring that 
sound credit-risk-management standards are upheld 
and that these keep pace with financial market inno-
vation. If competitive pressures lead to bad practices 
in one bank or the industry as a whole, our job as 
supervisors is to raise standards and ensure that sound 
practices are restored. 
In my remarks today, I highlighted a number of 
areas in which progress has been made. Of course, 
there is more work to be done by banks and supervi-
sors. High on the agenda should be the development 
of more meaningful measurement of risk exposure 
and the implementation of effective stress-testing 
techniques. Another important area that requires fur-
ther industry attention is the measurement of lever-
age. Finally, I believe that the industry should devote 
more thought to the appropriate valuation of posi-
tions during periods of market stress and illiquidity— 
which is particularly relevant to the use of collateral 
to protect against credit risk. 
These are just some of the broader issues arising 
from the LTCM experience and the market turbu-
lence last fall. But I believe that we are meeting the 
challenge and have made quick and significant short-
term progress. 
Statement by Richard A. Small, Assistant Director, 
Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation, 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
before the Subcommittee on Commercial and Admin-
istrative Law, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House 
of Representatives, March 4, 1999 
I am pleased to appear before the Subcommittee on 
Commercial and Administrative Law to discuss the 
proposed "Know Your Customer" regulation. As 
you are aware, the Federal Reserve, along with the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Office of 
Thrift Supervision, issued a notice of proposed rule-
making with regard to "Know Your Customer" on 
December 7, 1998. 
As a proposed regulation, there has been no final 
decision on the wording of any new regulation or, for 
that matter, whether it is necessary to have a new 
regulation. The rulemaking process provides for a 
period of time during which the public can comment 
on the specifics of the proposal. The comment period 
for this proposal concludes on March 8. As we are 
still in the midst of the comment period, I am not able 
to provide any information with regard to the Federal 
Reserve's determination as to how to proceed with 
the proposal. No determination will be made until the 
comment period has concluded and there has been an 
opportunity to complete the review of the comments 
that have been submitted. 
As we move forward in our review of the com-
ments and our determination as to whether, or how, 
to proceed with the proposed rule, we will carefully 
weigh three important issues. First, it has become 
clear that the proposal raises privacy concerns that 
also pose a real danger of eroding customer confi-
dence in the institutions at which they bank. The 
Federal Reserve recognizes the sensitivity of this 
issue. Second, the Federal Reserve will continue to 
recognize that participating in the government's 
programs designed to attack the laundering of pro-
ceeds of illegal activities through our nation's finan-
cial institutions could enhance public confidence 
in the integrity of our financial system. Third, we 
also will be mindful of industry concern about the 
potential burden that a "Know Your Customer" 
regulation might impose and that in doing so it 
would place banking organizations at a competitive 
disadvantage as the result of obligations that would 
come from the "Know Your Customer" regulation 
that do not apply to other types of financial service 
organizations subject to the provisions of the Bank 
Secrecy Act, such as brokerage firms and money 
transmitters. 
It would be useful to provide some background 
information about "Know Your Customer" policies 
and the purpose of the proposed rule. The concept of 
"Know Your Customer" has been around for quite 
some time. Many banks today use such policies and 
procedures to protect the integrity of their institu-
tions. In addition, bankers have expressed concern 
that there is no uniformity in the banking agencies' 
and the Department of the Treasury's guidance on 
identifying transactions that would have to be 
reported under existing suspicious activity reporting 
regulations. 
In the past, there have been expressions of congres-
sional interest in "Know Your Customer" regula-
tions. The Annunzio-Wylie Money Laundering Act 
of 1992 authorized the Department of the Treasury to 
prescribe minimum standards for the anti-money-
laundering programs of all financial institutions cov-
Federal Reserve Bulletin: May 1999310 Federal Reserve Bulletin • May 1999 
ered by the Bank Secrecy Act. The legislative history 
of this law and other legislation addressing the gov-
ernment's anti-money-laundering efforts indicates 
that the Congress expected that the minimum stan-
dards would include "Know Your Customer" poli-
cies. In the Money Laundering Deterrence Act of 
1998, which was approved by the House of Represen-
tatives near the end of the 1998 session, section 9 
included a requirement that the Secretary of the 
Treasury comply with the provisions of the 
Annunzio-Wylie Money Laundering Act by promul-
gating "Know Your Customer" regulations for finan-
cial institutions within 120 days of enactment of 
the legislation. 
These considerations led all of the federal bank 
supervisory agencies, including the Federal Reserve, 
to develop the proposal. In proposing the "Know 
Your Customer" regulation, it was our intent to pro-
vide banks with guidance as to what programs and 
procedures they should have in place to have suffi-
cient knowledge of their customers to assist in the 
detection and prevention of illicit activities occurring 
at or through the banks. I should note that the pro-
posal would not require banks routinely to turn over 
to the government information about their customers 
and would not require banks to monitor every cus-
tomer transaction. 
Statement by Oliver Ireland, Associate General 
Counsel, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, before the Subcommittee on Commercial and 
Administrative Law, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. 
House of Representatives, March 18, 1999 
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this 
subcommittee to present the views of the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System on title X, 
Financial Contract Provisions, of H.R. 833, the pro-
posed Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999. Title X 
includes a number of proposed amendments to the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Act and the Bankruptcy 
Code as well as other statutes related to financial 
transactions. Many of these provisions incorporate, 
or are based on, amendments to these statutes that 
were endorsed by the President's Working Group on 
Financial Markets. 
The Board supports enactment of the provisions 
recommended by the Working Group. Enactment of 
these provisions would reduce uncertainty for market 
participants as to the disposition of their financial 
market contracts if one of the parties becomes insol-
vent. This reduced uncertainty should limit market 
disruptions in the event of the insolvency, limit risk 
In an effort not to create a substantial burden for 
the majority of banking organizations, the proposal 
sets forth the concept of developing and applying 
"Know Your Customer" programs based on the per-
ceived risks associated with the various customers 
and the types of transactions that the banks under-
stood would be conducted by the customers. For the 
majority of customers, we assumed that banks would 
find that they posed no or minimal risk and that their 
"Know Your Customer" programs would be nothing 
more than formalizing existing procedures for identi-
fying customers and following existing suspicious 
activity reporting requirements. 
The proposal also recognized that privacy was a 
critical issue. We specifically solicited comments on 
"whether the actual or perceived invasion of personal 
privacy interests is outweighed by the additional 
compliance benefits anticipated by [the] proposal." 
To date, the response from the public on this issue 
has been unprecedented. The public comments indi-
cate that bank customers believe that the "Know 
Your Customer" rule will result in material invasions 
of their personal privacy interests. 
As I noted at the beginning, the comments have 
highlighted important issues, both with respect to 
privacy and other aspects of the proposal, that we 
will be considering in the days ahead. 
to federally supervised financial market participants, 
including insured depository institutions, and limit 
systemic risk. 
STATUTORY RECOGNITION OF FINANCIAL 
MARKET TRANSACTIONS 
Since its adoption in 1978, the Bankruptcy Code has 
been amended a number of times to recognize the 
nature and significance of certain financial market 
transactions and to provide these transactions special 
treatment in a bankruptcy proceeding. For example, 
in 1984, the code recognized the right of a repo 
market participant to liquidate a repurchase agree-
ment without regard to the otherwise applicable auto-
matic stay provisions of the code. In 1990, this recog-
nition was extended to permit swap participants to 
terminate and net swap agreements. Similar rights 
had previously been given to stock brokers, financial 
institutions, and clearing agencies with respect to 
securities contracts and commodity brokers and for-
ward contract merchants with respect to commodities 
and forward contracts. 
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Similarly, in 1989 in establishing the manner of the 
conduct of the receivership of insured depository 
institutions under federal law, the Financial Institu-
tions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 
1989 provided for the termination, or closeout, and 
netting of qualified financial contracts, including 
securities, commodity and forward contracts, and 
repurchase and swap agreements. The Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 
1991 provided further legal support for netting con-
tracts between two or more financial institutions or 
members of a clearing organization. 
IMPORTANCE OF CLOSEOUT, NETTING, AND 
COLLATERALS 
The importance of improving the legal regime under-
pinning financial markets has been recognized by the 
finance ministers of the Group of Seven countries 
who, in 1997, agreed "to introduce, where necessary 
and appropriate, legislative measures to ensure the 
enforceability of sound netting agreements in relation 
to insolvency and bankruptcy rules to reduce sys-
temic risk in international transactions." In this 
regard, it is important to ensure that financial market 
participants have the ability to terminate or close out 
and net financial market contracts and to realize on 
collateral pledged in connection with these contracts. 
Closeout 
Closeout refers to the right to terminate a contract 
upon an event of default and to compute a termina-
tion value due to or due from, the defaulting party, 
generally based on the market value of the contract at 
that time. This right is critical to the management of 
market risk by financial market participants. The 
value of most financial market contracts is volatile. 
While the degree of volatility varies with the nature 
and duration of the contract, this volatility can create 
significant market risk to the contracting parties. 
Many end users of these contracts have entered into 
them for hedging purposes. Dealers generally enter 
into these contracts in order to profit from meeting 
the needs of end users and other dealers. In both 
cases, the contracts typically either hedge or are 
hedged against market risk. Termination of the con-
tract allows the nondefaulting party to rehedge the 
position in order to control that market risk. By 
providing for termination of contracts on default, 
nondefaulting parties can remove uncertainty as to 
whether the contract will be performed, fix the value 
of the contract at that point, and proceed to rehedge 
themselves against market risk. If this process were 
stayed while the trustee or the receiver for a failed 
counterparty determined whether to perform the con-
tract, the delay would expose the nondefaulting party 
to potentially serious market risks during the pen-
dency of this decision process. 
Thus, the right to terminate or close out financial 
market contracts is important to the stability of finan-
cial market participants in the event of an insolvency 
and reduces the likelihood that a single insolvency 
will trigger other insolvencies due to the nondefault-
ing counterparties' inability to control their market 
risk. The right to terminate or close out protects 
federally supervised financial institutions, such as 
insured banks, on an individual basis, and by protect-
ing both supervised and unsupervised market partici-
pants, protects the markets from systemic problems 
of "domino failures." Further, absent termination and 
closeout rights, the inability of market participants to 
control their market risk is likely to lead them to 
reduce their market risk exposure, potentially drying 
up market liquidity and preventing the affected mar-
kets from serving their essential risk-management, 
credit-intermediation, and capital-raising functions. 
Netting 
Netting refers to the right to set off, or net, claims 
between two or more parties to arrive at a single 
obligation between the parties. In financial market 
transactions, netting can serve to reduce the credit 
exposure of counterparties to a failed debtor and 
thereby to limit "domino failures" and systemic 
risks. As an incident to limiting credit exposure, the 
ability to net contributes to market liquidity by per-
mitting more activity between counterparties within 
prudent credit limits. This liquidity can be important 
in minimizing market disruptions because of the fail-
ure of a market participant. 
Collateral 
Frequently, credit exposure under financial market 
transactions is collateralized. This practice is most 
visible in repurchase transactions in which cash and 
securities are exchanged at the beginning of the trans-
action and the exchange is reversed at the end of the 
transaction with appropriate adjustment for inter-
vening interest. In addition, market participants are 
requiring that credit exposure under over-the-counter 
derivative transactions be collateralized. The right to 
liquidate collateral immediately is important for pre-
serving the liquidity of financial market participants. 
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WORKING GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS 
Recognizing the importance of termination or close-
out, netting, and collateral in financial market transac-
tions, the Secretary of the Treasury on behalf of the 
President's Working Group on Financial Markets 
transmitted to the Congress, in March 1998, proposed 
legislation that would amend the banking laws and 
the Bankruptcy Code. The proposed legislation was 
the result of a multiyear interagency effort to make 
recommendations to improve the legal regime gov-
erning certain financial market contracts in insol-
vency situations. Explanatory material accompanying 
the proposed legislation described it as having four 
principal purposes: 
To strengthen the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and 
the FDIA that protect the enforceability of termination 
and close-out netting and related provisions of certain 
financial agreements and transactions. 
To harmonize the treatment of the financial agreements 
and transactions under the Bankruptcy Code and the 
FDIA. 
To amend the FDIA and FDICIA to clarify that certain 
rights of the FDIC acting as conservator or receiver 
for a failed insured depository institution (and in some 
situations, rights of SIPC and receivers of certain 
uninsured institutions) cannot be defeated by opera-
tion of the terms of FDICIA. 
To make other substantive and technical amendments to 
clarify the enforceability of financial agreements and 
transactions in bankruptcy or insolvency. 
TITLE X 
The provisions of title X, Financial Market Contracts, 
of H.R. 833 are largely based on the provisions that 
were endorsed by the Working Group. I understand 
that in these hearings there have been some concerns 
expressed over the effects some of the provisions of 
title X may have on proceedings under the Bank-
ruptcy Code and potentially on other creditors of an 
insolvent debtor. We recognize that amendments to 
the Bankruptcy Code that affect any particular class 
of creditors are likely to impact other creditors. At 
the same time, we believe that differing types of 
claims warrant differing treatment. The potential for 
effects on other creditors and the need for each rec-
ommended provision were considered in formulating 
the Working Group's recommendations. We continue 
to believe that the recommended statutory amend-
ments weighed these considerations appropriately. 
Additional language in title X is designed to fur-
ther the same ends that the Working Group sought 
to further. Other provisions, such as section 1012 
on Asset-Backed Securitizations, which was not 
included in the Working Group's recommendations, 
may foster the efficiency of the financial markets by 
promoting certainty. Nevertheless, I believe that the 
provisions endorsed by the Working Group are suffi-
ciently important to be pursued in this Congress even 
if other provisions are not included. 
This concludes my prepared statement. I will be 
happy to address any questions that the members of 
the subcommittee may have. 
Statement by Laurence H. Meyer, Member, Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, before the 
Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Con-
sumer Credit, Committee on Banking and Financial 
Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 24, 
1999 
I welcome this opportunity to discuss the Federal 
Reserve's supervisory actions in the aftermath of the 
near-collapse of Long Term Capital Management 
(LTCM). Today's hearings cover an important topic. 
The LTCM incident merits study to ensure that the 
lessons it provides are sufficiently understood and 
that constructive action is taken to effectively reduce 
the potential for similar events in the future, without 
compromising the efficiency of global capital 
markets. 
The primary issues raised by the LTCM incident 
appear to revolve around the broad theme of how to 
control the leverage and risk-taking of unregulated 
financial institutions—in particular, hedge funds—so 
that they do not become a source of systemic risk or 
jeopardize taxpayer funds via the federal safety net. 
In our market-based economy, the discipline pro-
vided by creditors and counterparties is the primary 
mechanism for "regulating" this risk-taking. In the 
case of LTCM, this discipline appears to have been 
compromised. Weaknesses in several key elements of 
the risk-management processes at some creditors and 
counterparties were magnified by competitive pres-
sures, resulting in risk exposures that may not have 
been fully understood or adequately managed. Less-
than-robust risk-management systems, evidenced by 
an overreliance on collateral, compromised both the 
assessment of counterparty creditworthiness and the 
measurement and control of risk exposures at several 
financial institutions. 
To be sure, the lessons stemming from this episode 
have not gone unlearned, and there is no lack of 
effort to identify and implement appropriate public 
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policy and private-sector responses to the potential 
risks posed by hedge funds. These efforts range from 
private industry and supervisory initiatives aimed at 
strengthening the credit-risk-management infrastruc-
tures at financial institutions, to consideration of 
enhanced disclosure by global financial institutions, 
to those evaluating the costs and benefits of direct 
regulation of hedge funds. 
Efforts to promote market discipline by strength-
ening the risk-management systems of creditors and 
counterparties offer the most immediate and efficient 
way to accomplish the desired objective of minimiz-
ing the potential for systemic risk arising from the 
activities of hedge funds. Supervisory oversight of 
bank-risk-management practices, including the issu-
ance of guidance on sound practices, reinforces the 
market discipline entailed in banks' assessment and 
surveillance of the risks taken by their counterparties. 
The recent guidance on sound risk-management prac-
tices issued by the Basle Committee on Bank Super-
vision, the Federal Reserve, and the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) represents sig-
nificant steps toward achieving the goal of enhancing 
market discipline. I commend the subcommittee's 
efforts to advance public awareness of these efforts 
by holding today's hearings on this recent supervi-
sory guidance. 
Of course, public sector work on promoting more 
effective market discipline on hedge funds and other 
entities that might employ leverage is by no means 
complete. The guidance and other supervisory efforts 
we are discussing here today target primarily com-
mercial banking institutions. Work under way by the 
International Organization of Securities Commis-
sions (IOSCO) to issue similar guidance regarding 
securities firms' relationships with hedge funds is 
another important step. Although not directly focused 
on the issue of hedge funds, international efforts to 
enhance public disclosure of financial institution risk 
profiles may also provide meaningful input. In this 
context, the recent consultative paper "Recommenda-
tions for Public Disclosure of Trading and Deriva-
tives Activities of Banks and Securities Firms," 
issued jointly last month by the Basle Committee on 
Bank Supervision and IOSCO, makes an important 
contribution to the discussion of possible public pol-
icy responses. In the United States, the President's 
Working Group on Financial Markets is considering 
a number of issues and policy responses regarding 
leveraged institutions and their relationships with 
their counterparties. Its report is expected in the near 
future. 
Despite these various public sector initiatives, the 
real key to effective market discipline lies in the 
players themselves—the private sector. The market 
has clearly learned from the LTCM incident, and our 
supervisory staff has seen significant tightening of 
credit standards on hedge funds as well as improve-
ments in the risk-management processes at major 
banking institutions. Here, too, much work remains. 
Accordingly, we look forward to the recommenda-
tions of the Counterparty Risk Management Policy 
Group (CRMPG) regarding private-sector initiatives 
for enhancing the credit-risk-management practices 
of creditors and their leveraged counterparties. Sub-
committees of this private industry group, comprised 
of major international banks, securities firms, and 
hedge funds, are investigating avenues for improving 
measures of derivative exposures and the exchange 
of information between counterparties. The findings 
of the group will reinforce the efforts to promote 
enhancement of risk-management systems at banking 
institutions and are expected to advance sound prac-
tices in key areas such as the type of information that 
can be exchanged between hedge funds and their 
counterparties without compromising hedge funds' 
proprietary information. 
SUPERVISORY EFFORTS BY THE FEDERAL 
RESERVE IN THE AFTERMATH OF LTCM 
In its role as a bank supervisor, the Federal Reserve's 
primary contribution to advancing market discipline 
lies in its responsibility to ensure that the risk-
management processes at individual banking organi-
zations are commensurate with the size and complex-
ity of their portfolios. We promote the adoption of 
sound risk-management practices through on-site 
reviews and targeted examinations of banking organi-
zations and by regularly issuing supervisory guidance 
to both banks and our supervisory staff. This morning 
I will briefly summarize recent Federal Reserve 
efforts in both of these areas and will explain how 
Federal Reserve supervisory guidance provides direc-
tion to banking institutions and examiners that sup-
ports, and is consistent with, that issued by the Basle 
Committee on Bank Supervision and the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency. President McDonough's 
testimony answers the subcommittee's questions 
regarding the recent guidance on highly leveraged 
institutions issued by the Basle Committee on Bank 
Supervision and the regulation of hedge funds in 
other developed countries. 
Immediately after the LTCM episode, the Federal 
Reserve detailed staff from the Board of Governors 
and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to con-
duct special reviews at those state member banks 
with significant hedge fund relationships to identify 
the following: 
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• The nature and magnitude of bank credit expo-
sures to hedge funds 
• The comprehensiveness of banks' due diligence 
processes regarding hedge funds 
• The quantitative controls used in managing expo-
sures to hedge funds 
• The adequacy of management information sys-
tems and internal controls with regard to hedge fund 
counterparties 
• The extent to which the LTCM relationship 
was an exception to banks' normal hedge fund 
relationships. 
Our review found that U.S. commercial banking 
exposures to hedge funds are primarily counterparty 
exposures arising from OTC derivatives contracts. 
Overall, direct unsecured loans to hedge funds have 
traditionally been a small portion of bank lending, 
even at the larger global institutions. As of the third 
quarter of 1998, direct unsecured loans disbursed by 
all U.S. commercial banks to hedge funds were esti-
mated at $1.7 billion, or approximately 1 percent of 
tier 1 capital of those banking institutions with expo-
sures to hedge funds. This amount represents only 
direct lending arrangements and includes $170 mil-
lion in loans dispersed by U.S. banks to LTCM under 
a $900 million shared national credit facility (most of 
which was participated to foreign banking organiza-
tions). It does not include the $900 million of equity 
investments in LTCM made by three U.S. banking 
organizations in September 1998. 
As of the third quarter of 1998, only five U.S. 
commercial banks had material OTC derivative expo-
sures to hedge fund counterparties. Credit exposures 
arising from these relationships consisted of the cur-
rent marked-to-market value of the derivative trans-
actions as well as the potential exposure that might 
arise from future changes in these market values (the 
potential future exposure or PFE). All of the banking 
institutions mark their derivative positions to market 
on a daily basis and require any net current market 
value owed to them to be fully collateralized, gener-
ally with high-quality securities, such as U.S. Trea-
suries or sovereign debt from Group of Ten (G-10) 
countries. For those hedge funds judged to be of 
lower credit quality, banks generally require the post-
ing of collateral or margin above current market 
values to protect against the potential future exposure 
of derivative contracts with these counterparties. 
With regard to LTCM, the review found that the 
fund was atypical among hedge fund counterparties 
in both the size of its positions and the amount of 
leverage it employed. While several hedge funds had 
larger net asset values (capital) than LTCM and a few 
funds may have employed the same or comparable 
book leverage, LTCM's combination of size and 
leverage was singular. 
Investigations of the management of the LTCM 
account at several institutions found that an over-
reliance on the collateralization of the current market 
value of derivatives positions and the stature of 
LTCM's managers led to compromises in several key 
elements of the credit-risk-management process. In 
some cases, assessments of LTCM's creditworthiness 
was found to be less than adequate as a result of 
limited information on the fund's true risk profile and 
risk-management capabilities. In particular, exposure 
measures and scenario analyses that could have iden-
tified potential losses under stress situations were 
found to be less than adequate. 
Importantly, while LTCM was found to be atypical 
among hedge fund counterparties, shortcomings in 
the risk management of hedge fund counterparty 
exposures appeared to extend beyond this one fund. 
In several cases, the review team found inadequate 
counterparty risk-management policies and proce-
dures. In others, while formal policies and procedures 
may have existed, gaps between policy and practices 
were identified. Specifically, the review team found 
that the due diligence and ongoing risk assessments 
of hedge funds were largely qualitative and lacked 
quantitative rigor. The review also found compro-
mises in the limit systems and methodologies of 
credit exposure measurement employed, including 
limited use of counterparty exposure stress testing. In 
particular, measures of the potential future exposures 
arising from derivative positions with hedge fund 
counterparties were found in need of significant 
enhancements at some banks. In general, banks 
placed undue reliance on the collateralization of cur-
rent mark-to-market exposures and underestimated 
the potential exposure that could arise under difficult 
market conditions. 
The findings of this special review served as a 
primary source for the Basle Supervisory Commit-
tee's recent report, "Banks' Interactions with Highly 
Leveraged Institutions." Federal Reserve staff played 
a major role in shaping the scope of the Basle docu-
ments, drafted significant portions of early versions 
of the Basle Committee's main paper, and provided 
significant input into its sound practices paper. Presi-
dent McDonough's testimony discusses, at length, 
the content of the Basle documents including the 
sound practices they identify. 
The Board of Governors fully endorses both Basle 
documents. The Basle guidance has been incorpo-
rated in Federal Reserve guidance by direct reference 
in our recent Supervision and Regulation Letter, 
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"Supervisory Guidance Regarding Counterparty 
Credit Risk Management" (S.R. 99-3). They have 
been transmitted by the appropriate Federal Reserve 
Banks to all state member banks and holding compa-
nies with significant hedge fund exposures and to all 
Federal Reserve staff supervising those institutions. 
Moreover, the March 1999 update to the Federal 
Reserve's Trading and Capital Markets Activities 
Manual will incorporate the specific sound prac-
tices identified in the Basle documents in a special 
hedge fund subsection of its existing Counterparty 
Credit Risk Management section. 
The results of the targeted reviews conducted in 
the third and fourth quarter of 1998 have been shared 
with each institution reviewed, and supervisory plans 
tailored to each institution's particular circumstances 
have been developed. Supervisory staff is monitoring 
each bank's management of hedge fund counterparty 
exposures as well as the bank's efforts to address any 
identified risk management shortcomings. 
I understand that other G-10 bank supervisors have 
translated the Basle documents into the appropriate 
foreign language and transmitted them to industry 
associations or institutions with hedge fund relation-
ships. In some cases, supervisors have taken steps to 
monitor bank hedge fund exposures and bank initia-
tives to enhance internal counterparty credit risk man-
agement systems. 
PRIVATE SECTOR RESPONSE IN THE 
AFTERMATH OF LTCM 
As would be expected coming out of the LTCM event 
and other market difficulties in 1998, banking institu-
tions, in their own self-interest, appear to be well 
under way in making enhancements to their credit 
risk management systems. With regard to the due 
diligence process, banks are requesting and receiving 
more information from their hedge fund counterpar-
ties, such as value-at-risk calculations, position con-
centrations, aggregate off-balance sheet positions, 
and the results of stress tests. Banks have also 
increased the rigor of the due diligence processes 
applied to hedge fund counterparties, including the 
use of their own quantitative risk-management spe-
cialists to conduct on-site reviews of hedge fund risk-
management systems. Increasingly, hedge funds rec-
ognize that they need to provide their counterparties 
with more information. All parties are looking for 
remedies short of having funds disclose specific posi-
tion information that they feel might compromise the 
integrity of their proprietary investment strategies. It 
is expected that a major contribution in this area will 
be made by the Counterparty Risk Management Pol-
icy Group. 
Banks are also moving to develop more realistic 
counterparty credit-risk-exposure measures including 
the development of various types of stress testing of 
their credit-risk exposures to major counterparties. 
Some banks are reviewing their policies regarding 
how, when, and with what type of counterparties 
they will require collateralization of potential future 
exposures. 
In general, all of the banks reviewed last year have 
conducted their own internal assessments of lessons 
learned and, in their own self-interest, are reassessing 
their business strategies regarding hedge funds and 
moving forward to make necessary enhancements to 
their risk-management processes. 
FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD GUIDANCE ON 
COUNTERPARTY CREDIT RISK MANAGEMENTS 
Federal Reserve supervisory guidance that is particu-
larly pertinent to issues surrounding bank relation-
ships with hedge funds was first issued in the Federal 
Reserve's Trading Activities Manual (TAM), pub-
lished in 1994. This manual discusses general sound 
practices for managing the market, credit, legal, 
liquidity and operating risks involved in bank trading 
and derivatives activities. The manual also provides 
guidance in other areas such as accounting, capital 
requirements, financial performance measurement, 
ethics and regulatory reporting, and compliance. It 
also provides more than thirty-five individual instru-
ment profiles that describe the risks and supervisory 
issues involved in each product. Over the years, this 
manual has come to serve as a definitive industry 
resource on sound risk-management practices as they 
relate to trading and derivative activities. Revision of 
the guidance in this manual is an ongoing process. 
The manual was substantively revised in 1998 and is 
updated each March and September. 
In 1994, the Federal Reserve also issued specific 
guidance focusing on hedge funds. Both this specific 
guidance and our manual emphasize the importance 
of sound financial analysis of counterparties that can 
quickly adjust their risk profiles. 
In reviewing the 1998 financial performance of 
large banking institutions, a number of general 
lessons on how, where, and why breakdowns in 
risk-management processes can occur have been 
reemphasized to both banks and bank supervisors. As 
has been the case in most instances of bank losses, 
competition, the pursuit of earnings, and the general 
press of business often result in the introduction of 
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risk exposures for which existing risk-management 
infrastructures may not be sufficient. Moreover, 
breakdowns in risk management most often arise in 
product, customer, and business lines that experi-
ence significant growth and above-normal initial 
profitability. 
In an effort to emphasize the importance of some 
of the general lessons highlighted by events over the 
past two years and to advance the application of these 
lessons in the interests of avoiding future difficulties 
in other areas, the Federal Reserve issued its supervi-
sory letter on counterparty credit-risk-management 
on February 1 of this year to provide general guid-
ance. The guidance is aimed at providing supervisors 
and bank management insights on those elements of 
counterparty credit-risk-management systems at large 
complex banking organizations that may need special 
review and enhancement in light of the rapid changes 
taking place in banking and financial markets. The 
guidance is targeted at relationships withl all types of 
bank counterparties, including hedge funds. It reiter-
ates and expands upon fundamental principles of 
counterparty credit-risk-management that are covered 
in existing supervisory materials of the Federal 
Reserve and other regulators, and in established 
industry standards. It emphasizes areas that, while 
generally understood for several years, have become 
increasingly important given the global linkages of 
financial markets. In particular, the important interre-
lationships between market and credit risks and their 
effect on the magnitude of derivative counterparty 
exposures, especially in times of stress, is an increas-
ingly important area that merits the attention of all 
banks engaged in derivative activities. Accord-
ingly, this issue is discussed at length in our recent 
guidance. 
From a broad perspective, the guidance advises 
banking institutions to focus sufficient resources on 
ensuring the adequacy of all elements of their coun-
terparty credit-risk-management systems, especially 
for activities, business lines and products experienc-
ing significant growth, above-normal profitability or 
risk profiles, and large potential future exposures. 
Recognizing that strong internal controls and internal 
audit functions are the first line of defense in avoid-
ing problems, the guidance also advises institutions 
to ensure that internal audit and independent risk 
management functions focus on growth, profitability, 
and risk criteria in targeting their reviews. Institu-
tions are also advised to calibrate their credit risk-
management policies and procedures to the risk 
profiles of specific types of counterparties and instru-
ments. Too often, general policies and procedures 
developed to cover all types of counterparty expo-
sures can lead to important gaps in the assessment of 
risks to specific types of counterparties. 
The guidance specifically addresses four basic ele-
ments of counterparty credit risk-management sys-
tems: the assessment of counterparty creditworthi-
ness; credit-risk-exposure measurement; the use of 
credit enhancements and contractual covenants; and 
credit-risk-exposure limit-setting and monitoring sys-
tems. With regard to the assessment of counterparty 
creditworthiness, the guidance points out the need for 
policies and procedures that are tailored to the risk 
profiles of counterparties and for internal controls 
that ensure actual practices conform with these poli-
cies. In complying with this guidance in the context 
of their hedge fund relationships, banks are expected 
to have specific policies for assessing the unique risk 
profiles of hedge funds, including the scope of due 
diligence analysis and ongoing monitoring to be con-
ducted, the type of information required from hedge 
fund counterparties, and the nature of stress testing 
used in assessing credit exposures to hedge funds. As 
mentioned earlier, the Federal Reserve has adopted 
the Basle Committee's recent guidance on sound 
practices governing bank relationships with hedge 
funds and expects that banks' internal policies regard-
ing their hedge fund relationships will be brought 
into compliance with those sound practices. 
In the area of exposure measurement, the Federal 
Reserve's guidance also points out that potential 
future exposure measures are becoming more impor-
tant in managing the credit exposures of derivatives 
positions. Accordingly, institutions must ensure that 
potential future exposures for both secured and unse-
cured positions are measured realistically and are 
better incorporated into measurement and limit sys-
tems. It also advises institutions to step up existing 
programs to enhance credit-risk-exposure measures 
by incorporating netting and portfolio effects. The 
need for better stress testing and scenario analysis of 
credit exposures that incorporates the interaction of 
credit and market risks is also identified. In essence, 
the guidance points to the need for a better balance 
between the qualitative and quantitative elements of 
exposure assessment and management for all types 
of counterparties. 
CONFORMANCE OF FEDERAL RESERVE 
SUPERVISORY GUIDANCE WITH OTHER 
SUPERVISORS 
The development of supervisory guidance on sound 
risk management, like industry practices, is an evolu-
tionary process enhanced by experience. It could be 
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argued that, to a large extent, the fundamental prin-
ciples of assessing counterparty credit risks, the mea-
suring and stress testing of the potential future expo-
sures of derivative positions, and the dangers of 
overreliance on collateral have been well documented 
in supervisory guidance for several years. However, 
given advances in technology and the increasing 
pace of financial innovation and market interdepen-
dency, the techniques and means used to implement 
these principles are under constant development and 
refinement. Accordingly, supervisors must endeavor 
to ensure that their guidance is as up to date as 
possible. 
As mentioned above, our most recent guidance 
both reemphasizes and supplements existing Federal 
Reserve Board principles and guidelines. Although 
different supervisors start from different bases of 
existing guidance, we believe the current body of 
Federal Reserve guidance on the risk management 
of trading, derivatives, and other capital markets 
activities is entirely consistent with that issued over 
the years by the Basle Committee on Bank Supervi-
sion and by other U.S. bank regulators. 
The recent guidance released by the Basle Commit-
tee, "Sound Practices for Interactions with Highly 
Leveraged Institutions (HLIs)," covers the same 
material and provides the same direction to super-
vised institutions for a specific type of counterparty 
as that addressing all types of counterparties con-
tained in existing Federal Reserve guidance. More-
over, as was mentioned above, the specific Basle 
guidance has been fully incorporated in the soon to 
be released updates to our Trading and Capital Mar-
kets Activities Manual. 
In addition, existing Federal Reserve guidance is 
also consistent with that issued by the OCC. In its 
most recent supplemental guidance to Banking Circu-
lar 277 and the Comptroller's Handbook for National 
Bank Examiners, the Comptroller identifies thirteen 
lessons learned from events over the past two years. 
Although Federal Reserve guidance on trading and 
derivative activities may use different formats, it con-
veys the same direction and sound practices to super-
vised institutions embodied in each of these thirteen 
lessons. For example, the Comptroller's recent guid-
ance discusses the need for senior management 
and the board of directors to understand the limits of 
their price-risk-measurement systems and goes on to 
emphasize the need for stress testing such exposures. 
Supervisory guidance of the Federal Reserve has 
long advised of the importance of stress testing mar-
ket risks and the conveyance of these reports to 
senior management and the board of directors so that 
they can fully understand the institution's risk expo-
sure and adjust risk tolerances accordingly. Our most 
recent guidance on the measurement of potential 
future exposures and stress testing supplements this 
prior guidance. 
Perhaps the most important guidance emphasized 
by the Federal Reserve and the OCC is that which 
advises banks and examiners to ensure that sufficient 
risk management is targeted at new, growing, and 
highly profitable activities. As mentioned above, such 
areas have been the source of most bank losses. 
In summary, the Federal Reserve believes that its 
existing supervisory guidance on trading and deriva-
tives activities at state member banks and bank 
holding companies is entirely consistent with, and 
complementary to, that of the Basle Committee on 
Bank Supervision and the OCC. Together, this super-
visory guidance offers a clear set of sound practices 
that, when implemented appropriately, serves to 
enhance and support market discipline by strength-
ening the risk-management processes of major credi-
tors and counterparties. 
SUPERVISORY LESSONS LEARNED 
Events in developing and developed financial mar-
kets and the various types of losses posted by bank-
ing institutions over the past two years, including 
recent events surrounding bank hedge fund relation-
ships, have also provided supervisors and examiners 
with important lessons. From one perspective, we 
would like to think that effective supervision contrib-
uted to the ability of U.S. institutions to weather the 
financial storms of the past two years. Our reviews 
indicated and the financial results illustrate that, while 
the LTCM incident and other episodes over the past 
two years may have significantly impacted earnings, 
they did not threaten the solvency of any U.S. com-
mercial banking institution. 
Still, our review of our own performance suggests 
room for enhancements on our part. Within the con-
text of the Federal Reserve's risk-focused approach 
to supervision, major counterparty exposures are gen-
erally reviewed during both regular and targeted 
reviews of banks' derivatives and counterparty credit 
risk systems. Our internal reviews found several 
cases in which examiners, like banking institutions, 
may have placed too much emphasis on the full 
collateralization of current exposures. In the past, 
examiners have generally focused supervisory 
resources on assessing the risks entailed in unsecured 
credit exposures. Moving forward, our guidance 
instructs examiners to incorporate measures of poten-
tial future exposure in stratifying samples and select-
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ing counterparties and transactions upon which to 
base targeted testing of practices and internal con-
trols, regardless of the collateralization of cur-
rent market value exposures. Examiners are also 
instructed to review the results and adequacy of an 
institution's stress testing and scenario analyses in 
assessing both the magnitude and management of 
credit exposure. 
The need to emphasize in-depth transaction testing 
is another important supervisory lesson learned (or 
relearned) in the LTCM case, and this is emphasized 
in our supervisory guidance. The increasing complex-
ity of financial markets and banking activities places 
a premium on focusing supervisory resources at high 
risk areas and conducting sufficient transaction 
testing to identify variances between policy and prac-
tice. Increasingly this involves conducting transac-
tion testing with highly qualified specialists. Target-
ing resources at retaining, recruiting, and developing 
such specialists as well as providing them automated 
tools to enhance their efficiency and effectiveness is a 
top supervisory priority at the Federal Reserve. 
CLOSING 
In closing, I would like to emphasize the significant 
amount of attention that the LTCM incident, in par-
ticular, and bank relationships with hedge funds, in 
Statement by William J. McDonough, President, Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of New York, before the Subcom-
mittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer 
Credit, Committee on Banking and Financial Ser-
vices, U.S. House of Representatives, March 24, 1999 
I appreciate the continued attention that you and your 
colleagues on the subcommittee and on the Banking 
Committee as a whole have brought to bear on the 
complex and important issues under discussion today. 
The near-failure of Long-Term Capital Manage-
ment (LTCM) last fall raised a number of issues 
regarding the activities of highly leveraged institu-
tions. Since then, banking supervisors have been hard 
at work to assess where banks have been deficient in 
their dealings with hedge funds and other highly 
leveraged institutions, which I will refer to as 
"HLIs." This work has resulted in the issuance of 
supervisory guidance, both internationally and in the 
United States, with the aim of improving banks' 
policies and practices regarding HLIs. 
I am happy to be appearing before you with my 
colleague Governor Meyer—who I understand will 
general, have received, and continue to receive, from 
both public and private venues. Although market 
discipline may not have worked in preventing the 
LTCM event in the first place, the marketplace has 
reacted appropriately and we have learned much to 
carry us forward. Banks and securities firms, in 
their own self-interest, have tightened their risk-
management processes as they relate to hedge funds. 
Hedge funds now face a new reality of tougher coun-
terparty oversight. Supervisors are also enhancing 
their oversight of banks' hedge fund exposures. The 
supervisory guidance issued by the Basle Supervisors 
Committee, the OCC, and the Federal Reserve repre-
sent an effective, quick, and needed response to an 
important issue. This guidance effectively reinforces 
private sector initiatives to enhance counterparty 
credit risk management processes. As I mentioned at 
the outset, even more work needs to be done to 
ensure that the lessons we have learned over the past 
two years become engrained in standard practice and 
to ensure that effective market discipline is brought to 
bear on the risk-taking of hedge funds and other 
entities that make use of significant financial lever-
age. In particular, we look forward to the reports and 
recommendations of the Counterparty Risk Manage-
ment Policy Group that will provide additional practi-
cal tools for implementing both industry and super-
visory sound practices in counterparty credit risk 
management. 
concentrate on discussing the Federal Reserve's pol-
icy guidance to banks regarding hedge funds—and 
Deputy Comptroller of the Currency Brosnan. I will 
focus my remarks on the work done at the interna-
tional level by the Basle Committee on Banking 
Supervision, which issued a report and sound prac-
tice recommendations on January 28 with regard to 
banks' dealings with HLIs. 
Before I get too far into the details, let me share 
with you my overall approach to the issues we will be 
discussing this morning. My views have been shaped 
not only by my positions as Chairman of the Basle 
Committee on Banking Supervision and President of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York but also by 
my twenty-two years of experience as a commercial 
banker. Both my private- and public-sector experi-
ence have led me to conclude that the LTCM epi-
sode, and the proper supervisory response to it, are 
fundamentally about two things: leverage and good 
judgment. 
Leverage is an important part of our financial sys-
tem. Most of the time leverage plays a positive role, 
resulting in greater market liquidity, greater credit 
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availability, and a more efficient allocation of 
resources in our economy. But problems can arise 
when financial institution^ ^ jo far in extending 
credit to their customers ^ lunterparties. That's 
where good judgment comes%ii. 
In my view, the most important decisions a banker 
can make are whom to do business with and how far 
that business relationship should be pursued. Those 
judgments are not easy: One of our fundamental 
aims as supervisors should be to see that banks are 
using the right tools to make those decisions. Because 
banks play a pivotal role in the world economy, 
the importance of these decisions cannot be 
underestimated. 
BASLE REPORT FINDINGS AND GUIDANCE 
Introduction 
Let me turn to the Basle Committee on Banking 
Supervision, which is composed of bank supervisors 
from the Group of Ten (G-10) countries who develop 
supervisory policy for internationally active banks. 
While the committee does not have formal enforce-
ment powers, its conclusions and recommendations 
are widely implemented, both in G-10 countries and 
in many other nations. The committee's report fo-
cuses on the relationship between banks and HLIs. 
Our goal was to provide a framework for identifying 
the broader issues raised by the LTCM episode, the 
policy responses of supervisors, and some key risk-
management challenges for the banking industry 
going forward. 
Because the Basle Committee's focus is on bank-
ing supervision and regulation, its primary emphasis 
has been on ensuring that major banks prudently 
manage their risk exposures to HLIs. The best way to 
achieve this is through the adoption of sound prac-
tices by the industry. It is primarily the responsibility 
of each banking organization to manage its risks. But 
given the special role that banks play in our economy 
and the systemic risks that can occur when they do 
not function properly, banks' risk-management activi-
ties are a legitimate public policy concern. Our sound 
practice standards give banks and their supervisors 
the tools to measure industry progress toward the 
goal of effective risk management. 
The committee's report revealed a number of defi-
ciencies in banks' practices. In particular, the com-
mittee observed an imbalance among the key ele-
ments of the credit-risk-management process, with 
too strong a reliance upon collateral to protect against 
credit losses. This undue emphasis, in turn, caused 
many banks to neglect other critical elements of 
effective credit risk management, including in-depth 
credit analyses of counterparties, effective exposure 
measurement and management techniques, and the 
use of stress testing. 
The Credit Approval Process 
For a bank to make sound lending decisions, it needs 
to obtain sufficient information about the borrower. 
Supervisors routinely emphasize the need for banks 
to have an effective credit approval process consist-
ing of formal policies and procedures, accompanied 
by documentation of actual credit decisions. I should 
note that banks' credit exposure to LTCM was in two 
forms: the exposure arising from the trading of finan-
cial products with LTCM, and the exposure stem-
ming from loans made to LTCM. Banks' primary 
exposure to LTCM was through their trading activi-
ties. Loans were not a large factor in the events that 
transpired last fall. 
Regardless of whether a bank is a trading counter-
party with, or a direct lender to, an HLI, it must 
obtain comprehensive and timely financial informa-
tion about that HLI's risk profile and credit quality, 
and it must perform ongoing credit analysis of that 
HLI. In addition, a bank must have a clear under-
standing of an HLI's operations and risk-management 
capabilities. The committee observed weaknesses in 
each of these areas. Let me give a few examples. 
For one, the committee found that banks did not 
obtain sufficient financial information to allow for a 
full assessment of how much and what types of risk 
had been assumed by large HLIs. In particular, banks 
did not obtain the information needed to assess lever-
age sufficiently. They did not have sufficient informa-
tion to understand HLIs' concentrations in particular 
markets and risk categories, or their exposure to 
broad trading strategies. 
Also, banks did not sufficiently understand the 
ability of HLIs to manage their risks. Because risk 
profiles can change from one day to the next, or even 
from moment to moment, it is necessary for an HLI's 
counterparties to ensure that the HLI can effectively 
manage its business operations and risks on an ongo-
ing basis. 
Exposure Measurement 
The committee also concluded that banks should 
develop better measures of the credit exposure result-
ing from different types of trading activities. In par-
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ticular, banks must develop more effective measures 
of what is called "potential future exposure." Poten-
tial future exposure measures the credit exposure 
between a counterparty and a bank and how this 
exposure could change in the future as market prices 
fluctuate. 
The ability of banks to measure potential future 
exposure is crucial when dealing with HLIs. Unfortu-
nately, methods for calculating potential future expo-
sure had not kept pace with the growth and complex-
ity of HLIs. As we have seen, under volatile market 
conditions, a bank's exposure to HLIs can grow 
substantially. 
In many instances, banks request HLIs to post 
collateral covering their exposures. However, a bank 
that does not use a realistic measurement of poten-
tial future exposure to decide how much collateral 
to require can later find its collateral holdings to 
be grossly insufficient. We expect the industry to 
develop more effective ways to measure and manage 
potential future exposure, and supervisors will closely 
monitor progress to ensure that this occurs. 
Stress Testing 
The committee's report also shows that banks must 
develop measures that better account for credit risk 
under extreme market conditions. This can be 
achieved through what we call "stress tests," where 
a bank conducts "what if" analyses of how credit 
exposures to a single counterparty could grow under 
these market conditions. These might include a large 
rise or fall in interest rates or a major change in an 
exchange rate. 
More rigorous stress testing could have given 
banks at least some warning of the types of exposures 
they faced last fall. The critical importance of stress 
testing is noted very explicitly in our new supervisory 
guidance. 
Sound Practice Recommendations 
in the Basle Committee Report 
The Basle report is accompanied by a sound practices 
document that sets forth an important set of standards 
that will guide both banks and their supervisors. 
Among other things, these sound practices call upon 
banks to 
• Establish clear policies governing their involve-
ment with HLIs 
• Adopt credit standards addressing the specific 
risks associated with HLIs 
• Establish meaningful measures of potential 
future exposure 
• Establish mear^ ^-%redit limits, incorporating 
the results of stress t £ 
• Monitor exposure
1^ a frequent basis. 
Banks generally tightened the credit-risk-
management standards for their HLI exposures after 
the near-collapse of LTCM. However, it is important 
that supervisors ensure that progress continues. 
Memories tend to be short, and we want to make sure 
that as markets calm down, as they have in the past 
months, banks do not return to the old ways of doing 
business. 
Possible Future Changes in the Capital Accord 
As you know, the Basle Capital Accord is one of the 
great successes of the Basle Committee. Well before 
the events of last fall, the Basle Committee was 
developing fundamental revisions to the accord to 
better reflect the many changes in financial markets 
and risk-management practices since the accord's 
creation in 1988. Among the G-10 supervisors, there 
is broad agreement that the future accord should 
make greater distinctions among a bank's credit risks. 
These discussions are continuing. 
The strong link between sound risk-management 
practice and the Capital Accord provides another 
reason for rapid adoption of the Basle Committee's 
sound practices. The HLI report raises several impor-
tant technical issues of relevance to the accord. For 
example, the committee's call for better measures of 
potential future exposure may apply to the way such 
exposures are measured for capital purposes in the 
accord. 
OTHER REGULATORY EFFORTS 
Introduction 
One of the Basle Committee's hopes is that its sound 
practice recommendations will be widely imple-
mented by supervisors both here and overseas. Gov-
ernor Meyer and Deputy Comptroller Brosnan will 
be discussing in detail the guidance issued by the 
Federal Reserve and the Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency. I should also note that the New York 
State Banking Department recently released a report 
on banks' hedge fund activities that supports the 
observations and supervisory priorities set forth in 
the Basle Committee report. In addition, international 
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supervisory bodies and supervisors from countries 
outside the United States are in the process of acting 
on many of the proposals discussed here today. 
Actions Regarding Hedge Funds by 
International Groups and Individual Countries 
In February, IOSCO, the International Organization 
of Securities Commissions, established a task force 
on HLIs. I understand that IOSCO is focusing on 
securities firms' dealing with hedge funds and the 
ways in which risk management and market transpar-
ency can be improved, which complements the Basle 
Committee's work concerning banks. Because banks 
and securities firms are the primary counterparties of 
HLIs, it is crucial that there be a coordinated supervi-
sory response at the international level among securi-
ties and bank regulators. 
At their meeting last month, the Group of Seven 
(G-7) countries issued a statement endorsing the 
efforts of both the Basle Committee and the IOSCO. 
The G-7 intends to continue to review the topic of 
HLIs, which will be of assistance as we urge coun-
tries to implement sound practices in this area. 
I would not want to characterize or opine upon 
the efforts of any one jurisdiction; many countries' 
efforts, like ours, are under way only recently and 
need time to develop and take hold. There probably 
will be differences in the degree to which supervisors 
in different countries address the questions I have 
discussed today—if only because the intensity of HLI 
activities varies among countries. But on the whole, I 
believe that supervisors in major countries will fol-
low up on the recommendations issued by the Basle 
Committee. 
Direct versus Indirect Methods of Addressing 
HLI Safety and Soundness 
Many governments have considered or will consider 
the advantages and disadvantages of imposing direct 
regulation on the HLI industry. The Basle Committee 
report discussed that issue and concluded that con-
centrating on the behavior of banks and other coun-
terparties doing business with HLIs would yield 
effective and more immediate results. 
A common element of many HLIs is that they are 
structured in ways that minimize their exposure to 
supervisory oversight and costs. Thus, many have 
chosen to organize themselves legally in jurisdictions 
that offer modest supervision and low taxes. 
Am I pleased that so many HLIs are organized 
legally in what many would characterize as tax 
havens? No. But I do not think that problems involv-
ing unwise exposure to HLIs can fairly be blamed on 
the fact that many of these entities are chartered 
offshore. To be sure, the due diligence review that 
banks make for every customer should encompass 
the customer's place of incorporation and its 
ramifications. 
Currently, I know of no comprehensive direct regu-
lation of hedge funds in any of the G-7 countries. 
There are, however, aspects of hedge fund activities, 
such as commodities and futures trading, that are 
subject to regulatory oversight. 
I do not believe that it would be easy to develop a 
workable approach to the direct oversight of hedge 
funds. The reality is that imposing direct regulation 
on hedge fund entities that are chartered in the major 
industrialized countries would likely result in the 
movement of all operations to sites offshore. Direct 
regulation of hedge funds would require a high level 
of coordination involving the political, legislative, 
and judicial bodies of many countries. This is clearly 
beyond the jurisdiction of most banking supervisors. 
As bank supervisors, we have opted for a strategy 
that will, I believe, bring substantial near-term results. 
Our approach to improving the financial system's 
interactions with HLIs is to focus quickly and aggres-
sively on the decisions by banks that could create 
excessive leverage or imprudent credit exposure. Per-
haps our strategy can be termed "indirect," but I am 
reasonably confident that it will succeed. 
CONCLUSION 
Chairman Roukema, I thank you and your colleagues 
for the opportunity to explain more about the interna-
tional efforts that address financial institutions' deal-
ings with hedge funds. I promised quick and decisive 
action on the events that were so fresh in our minds 
when I testified before you and other members of the 
House Banking Committee last fall. I hope you agree 
that we have made real progress at the Basle Commit-
tee level and in the supervisory developments you 
will hear about in Governor Meyer's and Deputy 
Comptroller Brosnan's testimony. 
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Statement by Edward M. Gramlich, Member, Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, before 
the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs, U.S. Senate, March 25, 1999 
I appreciate this opportunity to appear before the 
committee to present the views of the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System on cur-
rency collateral, financial netting, and consumer 
issues raised by the Conference Report on H.R. 3150, 
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998. The Board 
strongly supports section 1013 of the Conference 
Report relating to Federal Reserve collateral require-
ments and urges its inclusion in this year's legisla-
tion. The Board also strongly supports the financial 
contract provisions of title X of the Conference 
Report. Our testimony also offers comments on the 
consumer provisions found in sections 112, 113, 114, 
and 1128 of the Conference Report. 
CURRENCY COLLATERAL 
Section 16 of the Federal Reserve Act requires that 
the Federal Reserve collateralize Federal Reserve 
notes when they are issued. The list of eligible collat-
eral includes Treasury and federal agency securities, 
gold certificates, Special Drawing Right certificates, 
and foreign currencies, the items in bold print on the 
left side of the balance sheet in appendix A.
1 In 
addition, the legally eligible backing for currency 
includes discount window loans made under sec-
tion 13 of the Federal Reserve Act. Over the years 
sections have been added to the act that permit lend-
ing by the Federal Reserve to depository institutions 
under provisions other than section 13 and against a 
broader range of collateral than is allowed under 
section 13. However, the currency collateralization 
requirement of section 16 has not been similarly 
amended, thus limiting the types of loans the Federal 
Reserve can use to back the currency. 
To date, the Federal Reserve has always had more 
than enough collateral to back Federal Reserve notes. 
In recent years, however, the margin of excess cur-
rency collateral has been dwindling. The primary 
reason for the decline in excess currency collateral 
has been the development of retail sweep accounts. 
Retail sweep accounts are a technique used by banks 
to increase earnings by reducing their required 
reserves. Because of the growth of sweep accounts, 
1. The attachments to this statement are available from Publica-
tions Services, Mail Stop 127, Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, Washington, DC 20551, and on the Board's site on 
the World Wide Web (http://federalreserve.gov). 
required reserve balances have declined substantially 
over the past five years. 
Because reserve balances, unlike currency, do not 
have to be collateralized, they serve as a source of 
excess collateral for currency. To maintain a balance 
between the demand for and the supply of reserve 
balances that is consistent with the intended stance of 
monetary policy, the Federal Reserve has responded 
to the declining demand for reserves by accumulating 
a smaller volume of Treasury securities than it would 
have in the absence of retail sweep accounts. This 
means that the growth of retail sweep accounts has 
effectively diminished the margin of excess currency 
collateral. As additional sweep programs are imple-
mented, the margin will tend to shrink further. One 
can trace the effects of declining reserve balances on 
excess currency collateral in the simplified Federal 
Reserve balance sheet in appendix A—excess cur-
rency collateral was down to about $20 billion by the 
end of 1998 and is likely to drop further. 
The small margin of available collateral poses a 
serious potential problem for the Federal Reserve. 
Although discount window borrowing has been very 
low in recent years, it could increase substantially in 
the future. For example, one or more banks could 
experience operational problems (perhaps because of 
computer failures related to the century date change) 
that require a large volume of temporary funding 
from the discount window. These banks might not be 
able to tender the types of collateral that would 
qualify for loans under section 13. Consequently, any 
such loans would need to be made under other provi-
sions of the act, and under current law they would not 
be eligible to back currency. 
If the aggregate need for such loans exceeded 
excess currency collateral, the Federal Reserve would 
be faced with an unpalatable choice. Were the Fed-
eral Reserve to extend the credit, it would not be able 
to absorb all of the resulting excess reserves by 
selling Treasury securities from its portfolio because 
selling the necessary amount would cause a defi-
ciency in currency collateral. The increase in excess 
reserves would reduce short-term interest rates, caus-
ing an unintended easing of monetary policy and 
perhaps risking inflation. The situation would persist 
until the loans were repaid. Were the Federal Reserve 
instead to refuse to make the discount loans in order 
to maintain the stance of monetary policy and con-
tinue to collateralize the currency, the depository 
institutions seeking credit would not be able to meet 
their obligations, with possible adverse implications 
for the financial system as well as the individual 
depository institutions. Thus the Federal Reserve 
would need to choose between two of its most funda-
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mental policy objectives—protecting the value of the 
currency and preserving financial stability. 
The legislation in section 1013 of the Conference 
Report would greatly reduce the likelihood of circum-
stances that would give rise to such difficulties. It 
would authorize the Federal Reserve to collateralize 
the currency with all types of discount window loans, 
not just those made under section 13. By permitting 
all discount window loans to back the currency, the 
Federal Reserve would be able to collateralize cur-
rency fully—as the original framers of the Federal 
Reserve Act saw fit to require—in virtually all con-
ceivable circumstances while conducting mone-
tary policy in pursuit of the nation's macroeconomic 
objectives and making any and all discount window 
loans that are appropriate. 
I might note that section 101 of S. 576, the Senate 
regulatory relief bill, would also reduce the odds that 
the currency collateral requirement could inappropri-
ately constrain Federal Reserve operations. If the 
Federal Reserve were permitted to pay interest on 
required reserve balances, as provided for in that 
proposal, the incentives that depository institutions 
face to generate new retail sweep arrangements 
would be greatly reduced, and some banks would 
probably even dismantle such arrangements. As a 
result, the level of reserve balances should rise, pro-
viding a modest additional source of funds to pur-
chase collateral to back the currency. This step by 
itself would not be adequate to address the currency 
collateral issue, but it would help. More important, 
the prevention of further erosion in required reserve 
balances and the possibility that they would rise 
would assist the Federal Reserve in the implementa-
tion of monetary policy by forestalling the possibility 
that the volatility of overnight interest rates could rise 
substantially as a result of low reserve balances. The 
Federal Reserve strongly supports this section of 
S. 576. 
FINANCIAL NETTING 
The Federal Reserve commends the committee for 
addressing title X, Financial Contract Provisions, of 
H.R. 3150, Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, which 
was considered in the last Congress. Title X of 
H.R. 3150 included a number of proposed amend-
ments to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act and the 
Bankruptcy Code as well as other statutes related to 
financial transactions. Most of these amendments 
incorporated or were based on amendments to these 
statutes that were endorsed by the President's Work-
ing Group on Financial Markets. As discussed more 
fully in appendix B, the Board supports enactment of 
the amendments recommended by the Working 
Group. The importance of improving the legal regime 
underpinning financial markets has been recognized 
by the finance ministers of the Group of Seven coun-
tries. In this regard, the ability to terminate or close 
out and net contracts and to realize on collateral 
pledged in connection with these contracts is vital. 
Enactment of the provisions of title X would reduce 
uncertainty in these areas. This reduced uncertainty 
should foster market efficiency and limit market dis-
ruptions in the event of an insolvency, limit risk to 
federally supervised financial market participants, 
including insured depository institutions, and limit 
systemic risk. 
Closeout refers to the right to terminate a contract 
upon an event of default and to compute a termina-
tion value due to or due from the defaulting party, 
generally based on the market value of the contract at 
that time. By providing for termination of contracts 
on default, nondefaulting parties can remove uncer-
tainty as to whether the contract will be performed, 
fix the value of the contract at that point, and proceed 
to rehedge themselves against market risk. 
The right to terminate or close out contracts is 
important to the stability of market participants and 
reduces the likelihood that a single insolvency will 
trigger other insolvencies due to their market risk. 
Further, absent termination and closeout rights, the 
inability of market participants to control their mar-
ket risk is likely to lead them to reduce their mar-
ket risk exposure, potentially drying up market 
liquidity and preventing the affected markets from 
serving their essential risk-management, credit-
intermediation, and capital-raising functions. 
Netting refers to the right to set off, or net, claims 
between parties to arrive at a single obligation 
between the parties. Netting can serve to reduce the 
credit exposure of counterparties to a failed debtor 
and thereby to limit systemic risks and to foster 
market liquidity. 
Finally credit exposure under financial market 
transactions is frequently collateralized. The right to 
liquidate collateral immediately is important for pre-
serving the liquidity of financial market participants. 
Recognizing the importance of termination, or 
closeout, netting, and collateral, in March 1998 the 
Secretary of the Treasury, on behalf of the Presi-
dent's Working Group on Financial Markets, trans-
mitted to the Congress proposed legislation that 
would amend the banking laws and the Bankruptcy 
Code. As I noted previously, the provisions of 
Title X, Financial Market Contracts, of H.R. 3150 
were largely based on the provisions that were 
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endorsed by the Working Group. Additional language 
in title X was designed to further the same ends that 
the Working Group sought to promote. Other provi-
sions, such as section 1012 on Asset-Backed Securiti-
zations, which was not included in the Working 
Group's recommendations, may also foster the effi-
ciency of the financial markets by promoting cer-
tainty. I understand that there have also been con-
cerns expressed over this provision. Although we 
believe that this provision is beneficial, we think the 
provisions endorsed by the Working Group are suffi-
ciently important to be pursued by the Congress even 
if the asset securitization provision is not included. 
CONSUMER PROTECTION 
The Conference Report contains a number of provi-
sions relating to consumer protection laws the Fed-
eral Reserve Board administers. Section 113 would 
direct the Board to study the adequacy of existing 
protections that limit consumers' liability for the 
unauthorized use of "dual use" debit cards. Com-
monly debit cards—such as those used at an auto-
mated teller machine (ATM)—can be used only if the 
consumer provides a personal identification number 
(PIN). However, some debit cards can also be used 
without a PIN; consumers sign a sales draft as they 
would for credit cards. Consumers' liability under the 
Truth in Lending Act (TILA) for the unauthorized 
use of a credit card is no more than $50; for debit 
cards, the potential loss under the Electronic Fund 
Transfer Act (EFTA) can be much higher. Depending 
on how timely the consumer is in reporting the unau-
thorized use, the consumer's liability in the latter 
case may be as much as $500 and may even be 
unlimited if the consumer does not notify the institu-
tion within sixty days of the sending of a periodic 
statement listing an unauthorized transaction. 
Some observers have expressed concern that con-
sumers using debit cards in the same way that they 
use credit cards may not understand the difference in 
their potential risk of loss. The Conference Report 
requires that the Board study how well existing law 
protects consumers against unauthorized use of debit 
cards, whether the industry has enhanced the level of 
protection through voluntary rules, and whether addi-
tional amendments to the EFTA or the Board's regu-
lations are necessary. 
The Board believes that market discipline is pref-
erable to government-imposed regulations. As an 
example of how market discipline might work, both 
VISA and MasterCard have already voluntarily estab-
lished rules for financial institutions offering non-PIN 
protected debit cards that generally limit a consum-
er's liability to $50 or less. Though these rules are not 
identical to those in the EFTA and the Board's Regu-
lation E, which implements the EFTA, these volun-
tary rules bring consumers' liability for these debit 
cards more in line with the liability rules for credit 
cards. The voluntary rules govern all institutions 
offering these types of debit cards and thus diminish 
consumers' liability substantially. In this case we 
believe the private sector has already acted appropri-
ately to address the liability issue. 
With regard to the possible need for additional 
disclosures that explain how non-PIN protected debit 
cards differ from other credit cards, the Board is 
studying this matter. We have the authority under the 
EFTA to adopt additional disclosures but must weigh 
the value of additional consumer protection against 
the additional compliance costs that would be 
imposed. Because the industry has already estab-
lished voluntary limits on liability and the Board is 
currently analyzing the need for additional disclo-
sures, we believe the study mandated in section 
113(c) of the Conference Report may be unnecessary. 
Section 112 of the Conference Report would 
require that the Board study the adequacy of informa-
tion consumers receive about the deductibility of 
interest paid on home-secured credit transactions. 
The Board is to consider whether additional disclo-
sures are necessary when the total amount of the 
home-secured credit extended exceeds the fair mar-
ket value of the dwelling. 
The Truth in Lending Act and the Board's Regula-
tion Z, which implements TILA, currently have lim-
ited disclosure requirements about the effect of the 
credit transaction on consumers' income tax liability. 
Creditors offering home-secured lines of credit must 
provide generic disclosures when an application is 
made, including a statement warning consumers to 
consult a tax adviser regarding the deductibility of 
interest and other charges connected with the line of 
credit. Creditors offering purchase-money mortages 
and other home-secured installment loans are not 
required to provide any tax-related disclosures. 
The Board recognizes that it is useful for consum-
ers to be aware of the potential tax implications of 
home-secured credit transactions. But we have con-
cerns about the study required by section 112(a). The 
tax code is complex, and its applicability to each 
consumer depends on personal financial information 
and additional analysis. Creditors often do not have 
all the information that would permit them to provide 
specific meaningful tax advice to consumers. We 
would be concerned that additional disclosures might 
give consumers the impression that a creditor has 
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considered their individual circumstances and made a 
determination about the income tax consequences. In 
the end, the most meaningful disclosure a creditor 
could offer might be a generic statement advising the 
consumer to consult a tax adviser, or in the case of 
credit that exceeds a home's fair market value, a 
disclosure that the tax laws may not allow a deduc-
tion for all the interest paid on that loan. 
It will be very difficult to obtain the data necessary 
to do the study required by section 112(a). Findings 
would likely be based on consumer surveys that ask 
consumers to relate their experiences in deducting 
interest associated with home-secured credit for 
income tax purposes. Taxpayers are notoriously pri-
vate about their dealings with the Internal Revenue 
Service, and surveys about their dealings could result 
in unreliable information. 
The third Board study, required by section 114(e) 
of the Conference Report, addresses the adequacy of 
the information consumers receive about certain bor-
rowing practices that may result in financial prob-
lems. The focus of the study is consumers' practice 
of making only minimum payments on their credit 
card accounts or other revolving credit plans. The 
Board would be directed to use the results of the 
study to determine whether consumers need addi-
tional disclosures regarding minimum payment fea-
tures beyond the minimum payment disclosures 
added by other provisions of the bill. 
The Board is again concerned that there would be 
difficulties in obtaining reliable data. For example, 
the Board is asked to consider the extent to which the 
availability of low minimum payments causes finan-
cial difficulties and the impact of minimum payments 
on default rates. We believe that these relationships 
are difficult, perhaps impossible, to estimate. The 
Board would be happy to work with the Congress to 
draft a more manageable alternative. 
Section 114 of the Conference Report would 
amend TILA to require that creditors offering open-
end credit plans, such as credit cards, provide addi-
tional disclosures about minimum payments as well 
as arrangements in which consumers may "skip pay-
ments" while interest continues to accrue on the 
unpaid balance. It would also require that lenders 
provide an example of how long it would take to pay 
off a $500 balance if the consumer makes only the 
minimum payment and does not obtain additional 
credit. These disclosures would be provided when 
the account is opened, annually, and in the case of 
the minimum payment disclosure, on each periodic 
statement. 
Regarding these additional disclosures, the Board 
recognizes the value of ensuring that consumers bet-
ter understand the implications of making minimum 
payments on open-end credit plans. But the Congress 
might ask whether providing similar disclosures re-
peatedly, as required by this legislation, may have the 
unintended effect of creating "information overload" 
for consumers receiving these disclosures. Here is 
where a study might be helpful. 
Section 1128 amends TILA to prohibit creditors 
from terminating open-end credit accounts solely 
because the consumer does not incur a finance charge 
on the account. (Typically, these cardholders are 
"convenience users" who pay their credit card bal-
ances in full each month.) Under the provision, credi-
tors could terminate an account for inactivity of three 
months or more, but consumers who use their cards 
regularly and pay their balances in full could not have 
their accounts terminated for that reason. 
The Board generally does not favor federal laws 
that restrict creditors' ability to determine whether 
particular accounts or transactions are economically 
viable. We believe competition in the marketplace is 
the better approach for motivating creditors' activi-
ties, and the credit card market is certainly competi-
tive. Moreover, we have concerns about the possible 
consequences of such a prohibition. We are not aware 
that the practice of terminating accounts is prevalent 
in the industry, but we presume that to the extent 
creditors do so, it is because the accounts are consid-
ered unprofitable. If creditors cannot terminate these 
accounts, they will likely seek to recover their costs 
by increasing fees on convenience cardholders or for 
all their cardholders. 
In addition to these comments, the Board would 
also like to bring certain technical comments on the 
consumer provisions to the committee's attention. 
Statement Submitted by the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System to the Subcommittee on 
Capital Markets, Securities and Government Spon-
sored Enterprises, Committee on Banking and Finan-
cial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, 
March 25, 1999 
Technology is one of the three great driving forces 
that has changed the workings of the world's finan-
cial systems in the last generation. Along with global-
ization and deregulation, each of which received 
a strong impetus from technology, technological 
change has created an increasingly competitive and 
Federal Reserve Bulletin: May 1999326 Federal Reserve Bulletin • May 1999 
efficient system that is delivering services cheaper, 
faster, and more conveniently to savers, borrowers, 
wealth holders, and governments. In the process, of 
course, older ways of delivering services have had to 
adapt, change, or become less important. The way 
financial services are supervised and regulated 
has also had to respond and adapt to this new 
environment. 
Technology in financial systems involves the appli-
cation of computers, electronics, and financial theory 
to design, unbundle, reconfigure, deliver, and manage 
the component elements of financial instruments— 
risk, maturity (or duration), yield, obligor, benefi-
ciary, and so on. This process sets up a new dynamic 
in which financial market participants are continually 
looking for and offering new ways to unbundle and 
reconfigure components of financial instruments. 
From the supply side, these include the invention 
of new computational techniques that are more 
efficient, new models for pricing financial instru-
ments, and new ways of addressing customers' per-
ceptions of risks. From the demand side, asset hold-
ers and borrowers have a growing appetite for 
newly engineered products that will either insulate 
them from market volatility or will allow them to 
take advantage of the opportunities that result from 
globalization. 
These demands also reflect the opportunities that 
the newer financial instruments provide for differenti-
ating risks and allocating them to the investors most 
able and willing to bear them. By definition, this 
allocation process also enables those less willing and 
less able to bear risk to shift that risk away. In this 
process, financial products and asset prices are far 
better calibrated to the value preferences of indi-
vidual participants. And let us not forget, such risk-
shifting permits lenders to better serve risky borrow-
ers. Lenders can now extend credit to these kinds of 
borrowers, knowing that a portion of the risk can be 
shifted to other parties willing to bear it. Technologi-
cal change in sophisticated wholesale markets makes 
possible, it should be noted, better, cheaper, more 
efficient, and more widely available credit and asset 
choices in retail markets as well. Indeed, financial 
asset innovations and prices provide signals that not 
only enable entrepreneurs to more precisely allocate 
real capital facilities to produce those goods and 
services most valued by their customers but also open 
new channels for pricing credit more carefully over a 
wider spectrum of underlying risks. This process has 
undoubtedly improved national productivity growth 
and standards of living. 
Banks and other financial institutions have clearly 
adopted new financial technologies not only for their 
benefit to internal management of risks and product 
design but also as a major income-producing effort. 
Derivatives and other newly designed products are a 
significant factor in the rise in large banks' noninter-
est income and doubtless are a factor in the signifi-
cant gain in the finance industry's share of American 
output in the last decade. And these profits are but a 
small part of the economywide gain that their custom-
ers have received from the use of the new financial 
technology. 
Is there no downside to the new financial technol-
ogy? Of course there is. It facilitates the rapidity with 
which shocks can be transmitted. Both market partici-
pants and policymakers now have very little time to 
make critical decisions. Another effect from the tech-
nology is that market participants are now very reli-
ant on their models—both for pricing and risk man-
agement. These models are in turn based on historical 
relationships that may, in the event, prove to be 
incorrect. In short, there is a concern on the part of 
some observers that we may have traded efficiency, 
speed, risk-shifting, and diversification—all to indi-
vidual participant's benefits—for greater market 
vulnerability. 
Such an argument generally rests on the view that 
financial technology is not only increasing risk-taking 
but also concentrating it in those large institutions 
that are the most significant users of it. There is no 
doubt that the new technology has played a role in 
certain leveraged trading strategies and perhaps even 
the degree of leverage throughout the economy. 
Those that wish to take more risk now find it easier to 
do so. But we should note two important facts. First, 
in the derivatives market, overall exposures and risk 
are a zero sum game: For every loser there is a 
winner. Second, the losses that have emanated from 
market shocks at individual institutions have been 
less for product lines using the new technology than 
the losses on traditional portfolios. Derivatives, for 
example, have been bystanders to the losses in equi-
ties, commodities, and emerging market debt— 
hardly high-tech instruments—during recent periods 
of stress. Derivatives may well have intensified the 
losses in underlying markets, but they were scarcely 
the major factor. 
It may well be that future significant downturns in 
the economy may uncover additional risks that finan-
cial technology, globalization, and deregulation have 
created, but the evidence to date suggests those addi-
tional risks have been quite modest, especially when 
compared to the benefits. Like all new technologies, 
it is difficult, if not impossible, to predict their future 
uses and implications. It is incumbent on policymak-
ers to try to stay abreast of developments rather than 
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to limit technology in a futile effort to constrain risk 
taking. 
Two things are clear. First, trying to regulate limits 
to technology by law or regulation before we are 
certain of these future uses and implications would 
clearly unleash the law of unintended consequences, 
as institutions and markets shift geographically or 
develop new techniques not anticipated by the rule-
creators. A problem has to be clear before we try to 
fix it, and we must understand what the fix will do. 
Second, technological change makes it ever more 
important that the process of risk measurement and 
control keeps up with the realities of the market-
place. Bank supervision, for example, is increasingly 
emphasizing that process and, as we learn more from 
events, both the practitioners and the supervisors 
need to hone and adjust their methodology. By focus-
ing on process, bank supervision can allow individual 
technologies to develop that meet both prudential and 
market standards. • 
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